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Investor attention to rounding as a salient forecast feature  
This version: February 2016 
 
Abstract 
Prior research suggests that, when making economic decisions, investors focus on subsets of 
more salient information. We extend this research by examining variation in investor response to a 
salient feature in analyst forecasts. We focus on the roundness of analyst forecasts as a salient signal of 
imprecision. We examine whether: 1) investors notice rounding even though it is binary and has 
potentially limited information content, 2) investor reaction to rounding is affected by its repetition, and 
3) investor reaction to rounding varies by investor type. We document a weaker market reaction to 
rounded compared to non-rounded forecasts, consistent with investors using rounding as an indicator 
of less precise forecasts. Investor response to rounding is more pronounced in the presence of multiple 
rounded forecasts, simultaneously disclosed in analyst reports, and is primarily attributed to less 
sophisticated investors. We also provide evidence on investors’ delayed assimilation of the information 
content in rounded forecasts subsequent to the forecast announcement date. Our results shed light on 
the scope of limited investor attention.   
 
Keywords: limited investor attention, rounding, investor sophistication, repetition    
JEL Classifications: G14, G29, M41 
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Investor attention to rounding as a salient forecast feature 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we examine variation in investors’ response to a salient feature of analyst 
forecasts.1 Evidence exists that investors are subject to attentional constraints when making economic 
decisions and as a result focus on subsets of publicly available information that are more salient, i.e. 
that tend to stand out and are easier to process.2 Such selective attention to salient stimuli can be 
economically justified if time and attention are costly (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). The literature to 
date focuses largely on limited investor attention to information released by firms, e.g. in earnings 
announcements and annual reports. A number of studies examine how the form of information released 
by analysts, being key intermediaries in capital markets, affects investors’ abilities to assimilate 
earnings-related information (Clement and Tse, 2003; Gleason and Lee, 2003). The purpose of this 
study is to build on the latter evidence and examine variation in selective attention to a salient feature 
of analyst outputs. We focus on the roundness of analyst earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts (hereafter 
referred to as rounding). Rounding manifests itself in forecasts that end in zero or five (e.g. $1.00, 
$1.50, $1.15). We choose rounding because it allows us to assess variation in investor attention to 
salience along three dimensions. First, we examine whether investors notice rounding as a salient 
forecast feature even if it is less informative than other forecast characteristics (e.g. forecast horizon, 
prior forecast accuracy, firm experience, forecast frequency, forecast timeliness, broker size). Second, 
we examine whether investor reaction to the salient forecast feature is affected by the repetition of this 
feature. Finally, we study the variation in investor attention to the salient forecast feature by investor 
type. Our analysis contributes to the literature on limited attention by shedding light on the scope of 
investors’ attentional constraints.  
Rounding represents a common type of measurement error in discrete quantitative data based 
on subjects’ responses or observers’ assessments. It reflects a cognitive process associated with less 
effort, uncertainty and imprecision (e.g. Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Bradburn, 1990; Roberts and 
                                                          
1
 The salience of a stimulus is its prominence, tendency to ‘stand out’ or its degree of contrast with other stimuli 
in the environment (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, p.342).  
2
 See Kahneman (1973), Nisbett and Ross (1980), Fiske and Taylor (1991), etc. 
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Brewer, 2001). Consistent with this notion, prior studies examining rounding in analyst forecasts 
document that rounded forecasts are issued by less informed and lower effort analysts, and are, on 
average, less accurate (Herrmann and Thomas, 2005). Dechow and You (2012) further show that 
investors appreciate, to a degree, the rounding bias on analyst forecasts, and perceive rounded forecasts 
as a more noisy measure of the market’s expectation of earnings at earnings announcements.  
We examine whether and to what extent investors pay attention to the rounding feature of 
analyst forecasts at forecast revision announcements, given all other informative forecast characteristics 
that they can observe. The characteristics that investors use in appraising forecast quality include: 
analysts’ prior forecasting ability, brokerage firm affiliation, forecast frequency, forecast timeliness, 
firm-specific experience, firm and industry expertise (Park and Stice, 2000; Gleason and Lee, 2003). 
On the one hand, rounding is likely to be less informative to investors than other forecast attributes 
because, unlike these other characteristics, rounding is binary. Apart from revealing that a forecast is 
less accurate, the rounding feature has no further implication for the relative imprecision of the forecast.3 
On the other hand, the rounding feature of a forecast is more salient and easy-to-process characteristic 
and may thus serve as a summary costless indicator of less precise forecasts. Information that is easier 
to extract (e.g., more salient) tends to be more fully reflected in judgments or prices (Bloomfield, 2002). 
Also prior empirical studies show that information presented in salient form is absorbed more easily 
than information that is less salient and more difficult-to-process (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2002; 
Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Song and Swartz, 2008; Huang, Nekrasov, and Teoh, 2013; Ali and Gurun, 
2009, Palomino, Renneboog, and Zhang, 2009). The salience or form of information can also affect the 
perceptions of non-informationally equivalent disclosures (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003).4 There is also 
                                                          
3
 Dechow and You (2012) examine the decision to round as a trade-off between costs and benefits and show that 
analysts engage in rounding when the penny digit of the forecast is of less economic significance. Their 
interpretation of these findings is that a rounded forecast is a simple and more easily observable proxy for a more 
noisy measure of the market’s expectation of earnings. We argue that a rounded forecast is less informative than 
other forecast attributes because, while it signals that it is a noisy measure of the market’s expectation of earnings, 
it does not signal the extent of the noise due to its binary nature. 
4
 For instance, previous literature has shown that investors respond to re-announcements of irrelevant, redundant 
or old information when this information is presented in a more salient way (e.g., Schrand and Walther, 2000). 
Schrand and Walther (2000) show that managers strategically announce prior period information separately to 
influence investors’ perceptions of the benchmark used for evaluating current period earnings. Hand (1990) finds 
that investors respond to re-announced gains from debt equity swaps in earnings announcements and the gains are 
associated with mean abnormal returns. Other studies examining the effect of limited attention and salience on 
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evidence that individuals are prepared to pay for useless information, even when this is transparently 
the case (Powdthavee and Riyanto, 2015). Therefore, we hypothesize that, despite the binary nature and 
potentially limited informativeness of rounding, investors are likely to respond to it when appraising 
analyst forecasts. We state the first hypothesis in the null form:  
H1: Investors do not respond to rounding in analyst forecasts. 
Investors’ response to the information contained in a forecast characteristic is measured by the 
degree to which this characteristic contributes to explaining return responses. Clement and Tse (2003) 
show that, holding the magnitude of the revision constant, investor response increases with broker size, 
forecast frequency and timeliness. If, in line with prior evidence, rounding is negatively associated with 
forecast precision then, investors’ response to rounding at revision announcements would translate into 
a weaker reaction to the information of rounded (i.e. less precise) forecasts compared to non-rounded 
(i.e. more precise) forecasts, holding the magnitude of the revision constant.  
The next testable prediction relates to the repetition of the rounding feature. Previous rounding 
literature has focused on rounding at a given point in time (Herrmann and Thomas, 2005; Zhou, 2010; 
Dechow and You, 2012). Given prior evidence on analyst performance persistence (Sinha, Brown, and 
Das, 1997; Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004; Bradshaw, Brown and Huang, 2013, etc.), it is likely 
that analysts who issue rounded forecasts do so consistently over time and across forecasting horizons. 
Analyst reports usually contain the previous forecast issued for the same year, the current forecast, and 
a one-year-ahead forecast. The inclusion of the previous forecast in analyst reports is warranted by the 
need to explain to investors the changes that have taken place in the firm or its environment since the 
previous forecast issuance and the impact of these changes on firm valuation. The publication of a one-
year-ahead forecast in analyst reports is a regular analyst output that reveals the analyst view of the 
firm’s future prospects.5 The current, previous and one-year-ahead forecasts are usually presented side 
by side as illustrated by the sample analyst report in Appendix B. The issuance of multiple rounded 
                                                          
stock prices include Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman 1999), Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau, (2001), Huberman and 
Regev (2001). 
5Asquith, Mikhail and Au, (2005) document that 99.1% of the analyst reports they examine provide an EPS 
forecast and 95.3% of these reports contain forecasts for at least one subsequent year. 
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forecasts that are simultaneously disclosed and observed by investors at no extra cost is likely to 
reinforce the salience of the rounding feature. Hillstrom (2000) provides experimental evidence that the 
repetition of a feature makes salient features even more salient. In line with this, a number of studies 
capture the prominence of a disclosure item in analyst reports by its repetition (e.g. Asquith, Mikhail 
and Au, 2005; Previts, Previts, Bricker, Robinson and Young, 1994). To the extent that investor 
attention is drawn to the higher salience of simultaneously disclosed multiple rounded forecasts, we 
expect that investors place more importance on rounding as an indicator of imprecise forecasts when 
there are multiple rounded forecasts in the analyst report (i.e. when a rounded forecast is issued 
alongside a rounded previous forecast and a rounded one-year-ahead forecast). If rounding repetition is 
perceived as more salient and reinforces the idea that rounded forecasts are less precise, we expect that, 
holding the magnitude of the revision constant, the market reaction to repeated rounding will be even 
weaker than to one-time rounding. We state this hypothesis in the null form:  
H2: There is no difference in investors’ response to repeated and one-time rounding in analyst 
forecasts. 
Our final prediction is related to more sophisticated and less sophisticated investors’ use of 
rounding. Existing experimental evidence on limited attention suggests that limited attention may affect 
both naïve and sophisticated investors’ interpretation of financial information (Hopkins, 1996; Hirst 
and Hopkins, 1998; Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson, 2002, etc.).  However, evidence exists that small 
traders are less thorough in their interpretation of earnings-related disclosures (Bhattacharya, 2001; 
Allee, Bhattacharya, Black and Christensen, 2007; Battalio and Mendenhall, 2005, Blau, DeLisle and 
Price, 2015). Less sophisticated investors tend to be also more susceptible to salience and ease of 
processing effects than more sophisticated investors (Miao, Teoh and Zhu, 2013).6 This evidence 
suggests that more sophisticated investors may monitor additional informative and more costly-to-
process analyst characteristics in responding to forecast revisions compared to less sophisticated 
                                                          
6Miao et al. (2013) document that more sophisticated investors discount accruals relative to cash flows regardless 
of whether a statement of cash flows (SCF) is provided or not, whereas less sophisticated investors discount 
accruals relative to cash flows only when SCF is provided. 
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investors. This might diminish the relative importance more sophisticated investors place on forecast 
rounding and increase the weight they place on other less salient but informative forecast characteristics. 
In addition, if less sophisticated investors are also less busy, i.e. their attention may be less fully 
occupied than that of more sophisticated investors. Lavie’s (2005) load model suggests that individuals 
whose attention is not fully occupied (loaded) may be more prone to distraction by salient stimuli.7 
Investors’ response to rounding may therefore vary with the level of investor sophistication. We expect 
that less sophisticated investors take into account the rounding feature of analyst forecasts to a greater 
extent compared to more sophisticated investors when responding to analysts’ forecasts. Holding the 
magnitude of the revision constant, this would translate into a weaker response to rounding by less 
sophisticated than by more sophisticated investors.  The third hypothesis, stated in the null, is the 
following: 
H3: Investors’ response to rounding in analyst forecasts does not vary with the level of investor 
sophistication. 
In the empirical tests, we first examine whether investors use rounding as a salient forecast 
feature associated with imprecision, i.e. react less strongly to information in rounded compared to non-
rounded forecasts.  We then examine whether investor attention to rounding increases with the 
recurrence of rounding instances within the analyst report. Third, we examine whether investors’ 
response to rounding in analyst forecasts varies with the level of investor sophistication. We use 
institutional ownership or institutional turnover as proxies for investor sophistication (Bonner, Walther, 
and Young, 2003; Hilary and Hsu, 2013, Collins, Gong and Hribar, 2003). Our results show that 
investors react less strongly to rounded than to non-rounded forecasts, consistent with investors using 
rounding as an indicator of less precise forecasts. We document even weaker investor reaction to 
                                                          
7
 Lavie’s (2005) load model suggests that interference from less relevant stimuli (e.g. rounding) is more likely to 
occur when attention is not fully occupied (loaded).  
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rounding when multiple rounded forecasts are simultaneously disclosed in analyst reports and show that 
investors’ response to rounding is primarily attributed to less sophisticated investors.  
We complete our analysis by investigating whether rounding is associated with price 
adjustments following the forecast revision announcement. If investors’ use of rounding, and especially 
of repeated rounding, deters them from fully appraising all remaining informative cues, there may be 
subsequent price adjustments reflecting delayed assimilation of the information content in rounded 
forecasts. We test this assertion by examining whether the rounding indicator can predict one-year-
ahead size-adjusted returns. We find that rounding and, to a greater extent repeated rounding help 
explain cross-sectional variation in future stock returns after controlling for revision quantity, revision 
quality (e.g. forecast innovation), analyst coverage and systematic risk factors  (size, book-to-market 
and momentum).  This evidence supports the idea of investors’ susceptibility to the salience of rounding 
and their relative detraction from more subtle analyst characteristics at the revision announcement. We 
conduct a number of robustness tests to ensure our results are not affected by the anticipation of a 
rounded actual EPS, firm characteristics that determine rounding (e.g. firm complexity, see Dechow 
and You, 2012), analyst characteristics, broker firm characteristics, and concurrent confounding events 
during the revision announcement window. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the research design. 
Section 3 describes the data and the main empirical results. Section 4 presents additional tests and 
Section 5 discusses the study’s contribution and the implications of its findings. 
 
2. Research Design 
2.1. Measuring the stock market response to forecast revisions  
We measure investor response to forecast revisions by the three-day (–1, 0, +1) mean 
cumulative size-adjusted return (SARijt) surrounding analyst i’s earnings forecast revision for firm j in 
year t. The cumulating period starts in day –1 and ends in day +1 where day 0 is the forecast revision 
announcement date and days –1 and +1 are trading days. SARs are calculated as the difference between 
9 
 
the buy-and-hold return of the firm and the buy-and-hold return of an equal-weighted portfolio of firms 
in the same NYSE decile.  
  
2.2 Tests of stock market response to forecast revisions 
Previous research has shown that the market reaction to forecast revisions varies with analyst 
characteristics and forecast features that are associated with forecast accuracy (Abarbanell, Lanen and 
Verrecchia, 1995, Clement and Tse, 2003; Bonner et al., 2003). To examine the extent to which 
investors use rounding relative to other characteristics in responding to analyst forecast revisions, we 
use the following model:   
 
 = 		 + 	 ∗  +  +


∗ _ℎ!"!## + μ_ℎ!"!## + % 
            (1)                                 
The variable definitions in the model are as follows. SARijt is the three day size-adjusted return defined 
above. REVPijt is analyst i’s forecast revision for firm j in year t scaled by closing stock price two days 
prior to the revision. The forecast revision is the difference between analyst i’s latest forecast 
outstanding at the earnings announcement date and analyst i’s most recent prior forecast.8 ROUNDijt is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst i’s latest forecast for firm j in year t outstanding at the 
earnings announcement date in year t (hereafter current forecast) ends in zero or five; and 0 otherwise. 
REVPijt *ROUNDijt measures the differential market response to rounded forecasts compared to non-
rounded forecasts. The remaining interaction terms REVPijt *Analyst_characteristicsijt capture the 
investor response variation with each of the analyst characteristics. These characteristics include 
features associated with forecast accuracy (Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 1997; Clement, 1999; Jacob, 
Lys and Neale, 1999; Brown, 2001; Brown, 1991; Brown and Mohd, 2003, Clement and Tse, 2003) 
                                                          
8
 Our choice of the forecast revision measurement as the difference between the analyst’s current and prior forecast 
is consistent with prior literature (Gleason and Lee, 2003; Stickel, 1991; Imhoff and Lobo, 1984). We also follow 
previous literature (Herrmann and Thomas 2005; Dechow and You, 2012) in focusing on the latest analyst forecast 
outstanding at the earnings announcement date.  
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and with the likelihood of rounding (Herrmann and Thomas, 2005), namely, forecast horizon, prior 
forecast accuracy, broker size, firm experience, forecast frequency, number of days elapsed since the 
prior forecast, number of companies and number of industries that the analyst follows.  Consistent with 
prior evidence, we expect investor response to increase with prior forecast accuracy, broker size, 
forecast frequency, and firm experience and to decrease with the forecast horizon, days elapsed since 
the last forecast and the number of companies and industries followed. If investors react to rounding in 
analyst forecasts as if it is an indicator of less precise forecasts, we expect the coefficient on the 
interaction term REVP*ROUND to be negative and significant. 
To enable comparisons between investor weights on analyst characteristics and to assess the 
relative importance of rounding in explaining investor response, we estimate equation 1 with all analyst 
characteristics defined as indicator variables like ROUND. We set each variable to be equal to 0 (1) 
when its value is below (above) the yearly median.9  
To test how the market response to analyst forecast revisions varies with rounding repetition, 
we estimate equation (1) by splitting rounded forecasts (ROUND = 1) into two groups depending on 
repetition: repeated rounding (REPEATED_ROUND) and one-time rounding (ONE-TIME_ROUND).   
REPEATED_ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 when an analyst report contains a rounded 
current forecast for firm j in time t (ROUND = 1) and a rounded previous forecast and/or rounded one-
year-ahead forecast, 0 otherwise.  ONE-TIME_ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 if only the 
current forecast in the analyst report is rounded, 0 otherwise. The previous forecast is the most recent 
prior forecast that we use in calculating the analyst forecast revision (REVP), while the one-year-ahead 
forecast is the earnings forecast for the subsequent period issued at the same time as the current forecast. 
We estimate our equations by clustering the standard errors by firm and revision announcement date 
(similar to Hui and Yeung, 2013) to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated residuals. We also include year fixed effects. 
                                                          
9
 As a robustness test we standardize all variables, including rounding, by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation of each variable (standard normal distribution). When using this measurement, the 
coefficients on analyst characteristics reflect the impact of one standard deviation instead of extreme changes in 
the variables and the relative weights are comparable. The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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3. Sample and results  
3.1 Sample  
We obtain analyst forecasts and actual data on annual earnings per share from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I⁄B⁄E⁄S) unadjusted detail file. We use the unadjusted detail tape to avoid a 
retroactive stock split rounding effect as highlighted by Baber and Kang (2002). Returns data are 
gathered from the Centre for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) and the rest of the financial variables 
are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Our sample period starts in 1984, the first year with available analyst 
forecast data after imposing the sample restrictions, and ends in 2012. Table 1, Panel A, describes the 
sample selection. Consistent with Herrmann and Thomas (2005) and Dechow and You (2012), we select 
all available analyst EPS forecasts issued closest to the earnings announcement date. Applying the 
sample restrictions of these two studies, we delete observations when the forecast horizon in the current 
year is less than 10 or more than 300 calendar days from the earnings announcement; we require at least 
two forecasts per analyst; and we retain firms that are followed by at least one analyst that issues 
rounded forecasts and one analyst that issues non-rounded forecasts. We retain observations with 
available data on analyst characteristics and three-day cumulative size-adjusted returns. In calculating 
the returns, we exclude dividend announcements and earnings announcements for the same firm during 
the three-day revision announcement window to mitigate the effect of confounding events.10 Finally, 
we remove observations with fewer than two analysts’ forecasts per firm when standardizing analyst 
characteristics (see footnote 9), and trim forecast revisions at the top and bottom 1%. The final sample 
consists of 268,970 forecasts, 39,011 firm-years and 7,311 firms.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency of rounding in analyst forecasts and actual earnings 
per share. Consistent with previous evidence, rounding is much more prevalent in analyst forecasts 
(41% of forecasts are rounded (ROUND = 1)) than in actual earnings per share (22% of actual earnings 
are rounded). Almost 79% (=87,317/110,699) of the analysts who issue a rounded current forecast 
                                                          
10
 In the main analysis we do not exclude forecast revisions by other analysts issued in the three-day window, but 
we exclude them in a robustness test and the results after the exclusion are qualitatively the same.  
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(ROUND =1) also report a rounded previous forecast and/or a rounded one-year-ahead forecast in their 
report (mean REPEATED_ROUND = 32%). Further untabulated analysis shows that the most frequent 
combination of repeated rounding is that of the current and one-year ahead forecast (in 70% of instances 
where the current forecast is rounded, the one-year-ahead forecast is also rounded), but cases where all 
three forecasts, current, previous and one-year ahead, are rounded are also fairly frequent (in 50% of 
instances where the current forecast is rounded, the previous and the one-year-ahead forecasts are also 
rounded).  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for analyst characteristics. To ensure that our sample is 
comparable to the samples of previous studies, we standardize the variables used to calculate descriptive 
statistics in a manner similar to Clement and Tse (2003), Herrmann and Thomas (2005) and Dechow 
and You (2012).11 The standardization transforms the original minimum and maximum values of each 
variable to values of 0 and 1, respectively. Appendix A provides the definitions of the standardized 
variables in detail. This standardization yields a relative measure of each analyst characteristic among 
those of all analysts who follow the same firm in the same period, filtering out systematic firm and year 
differences in the characteristics.12 
We report the statistics for the standardized variables. The distributions of analyst 
characteristics in Panel A are comparable to those reported by previous studies (Clement, 1999; 
Clement and Tse, 2003; Herrmann and Thomas, 2005).13 In Panel B we report the averages of the 
standardized analyst characteristics for rounded (ROUND =1) and non-rounded (ROUND = 0) forecasts 
and the t-statistics and p-values for the difference in means. Consistent with Herrmann and Thomas 
(2005), mean accuracy is significantly lower for rounded than for non-rounded forecasts. Relative to 
non-rounded forecasts, rounded forecasts seem to be issued earlier in the year and by less active 
                                                          
11
 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we repeat the analysis using analyst characteristics standardized in 
this way. 
12
 For prior forecast accuracy we set the standardized variable to 0 for the least accurate forecast (highest absolute 
forecast error) and 1 for the most accurate forecast (lowest absolute forecast error) to ensure that the measure of 
performance increases with forecast accuracy.  
13
 Based on raw analyst characteristics (statistics not tabulated), forecasts precede the earnings announcement date 
by 102 days on average and analysts have on average 4 years of firm specific experience; they follow 9 firms in 
4 industries on average and provide about 4 twelve-days-apart forecasts for each firm in a given year. The average 
broker firm employs 45 analysts.  
13 
 
analysts. We find the greatest differences in means between the samples of rounded and non-rounded 
forecasts for forecast frequency (−0.072, p-value <0.001) and forecast horizon (0.059, p-value <0.001). 
The direction of these mean differences is consistent with rounded forecasts being less accurate.14  
Panel C of Table 2 reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations among the variables above 
(below) the diagonal. As expected, forecast accuracy is negatively correlated with rounding and forecast 
horizon, and positively correlated with broker size, firm experience and forecast frequency.  
 
3.3 Empirical Results  
3.3.1 Stock market response to forecast revisions conditional on rounding  
Table 3 reports 3-day mean cumulative size-adjusted returns, SARs, around analyst forecast 
revisions. Panel A confirms previous literature results that good news revisions (REVP >0) are 
associated with positive abnormal returns and bad news revisions (REVP < 0) are associated with 
negative abnormal returns (Gleason and Lee, 2003). Consistent with Stickel (1991), the highest positive 
and the lowest negative SARs are documented for the top 5% and bottom 5% of forecast revisions, 
respectively (Panel A). To measure the difference in market reaction to rounded and non-rounded 
forecasts, we condition the returns to positive and negative revisions and the returns to revisions of 
different magnitude (bottom 5th percentile, 5th to 50th percentile; 50th to 95th and top 5th percentile) on 
rounding type (Panel B). The main result from panel B is that rounded forecasts are associated with a 
weaker three-day price response than non-rounded forecasts. On average, firms that have positive 
(negative) revisions with non-rounded forecasts experience a 3-day return of 1.6% (−1.8%). The 3-day 
return to firms with positive (negative) revisions where the revised forecast is rounded are significantly 
smaller in absolute magnitude: 1.3% (−1.3%) respectively. Accordingly, the mean three-day hedge 
return, calculated as the difference between returns to positive and negative forecast revisions,  is 
significantly smaller for rounded forecasts (2.6%) than for non-rounded forecasts (3.3%). Furthermore, 
the hedge returns from going long on the top 5% and short on the bottom 5% of forecast revisions are 
                                                          
14
 In additional univariate analysis, consistent with Dechow and You (2012), we find that firms with rounded EPS 
forecasts have EPS of larger magnitude, lower growth characteristics (e.g. lower stock volume and volatility, 
higher book to market) and higher business complexity (larger firms with more business segments).   
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5.9% for non-rounded (2.7% for top 5% minus −3.2% for bottom 5%) forecasts and only 4.1%  for 
rounded forecasts (1.8% for top 5% minus −2.2% for bottom 5%). The weaker investor response to 
rounded forecasts, captured by the lower absolute returns to rounded than to non-rounded forecasts, is 
statistically significant across all categories. This initial result is consistent with investors using 
rounding as a signal of less precise forecasts.  
Table 4 presents results on how investor reaction to forecast revisions varies with analyst 
characteristics including rounding (equation 1). In the first column we include all analyst characteristics 
except ROUND. In this specification, investor response to analyst forecast revisions varies only with 
four out of the eight analyst attributes: forecast horizon (FOR_HORIZON_D), brokerage firm size 
(BROKER_SIZE_D), forecast frequency (N_FORECASTS_D) and number of days elapsed since the 
prior forecast (DAYS_ELAPSED_D) as evident from the significant interaction terms of these variables 
with REVP. The results suggest that investors respond more strongly to forecast revisions issued earlier 
in the year (i.e. with larger forecast horizon), shortly after the last forecast revision (i.e. less days elapsed 
since the last forecast), and by analysts releasing more frequent forecasts and working for larger 
brokerage firms.15 When we add ROUND to the rest of the analyst characteristics (second column of 
regression results), we find that rounding is incrementally significant in explaining stock returns (REVP 
x ROUND coeff. = −0.331, t-stat = −10.05). The economic interpretation of this coefficient is that an 
increase in ROUND from 0 to 1 is associated with a 0.331 decrease in the association between SAR and 
REVP, i.e. when forecasts are rounded the association between returns and forecast revisions is lower 
than when forecasts are non-rounded. This is an economically significant effect, given the standard 
deviation of the association between SAR and REVP.16  The other characteristics significantly associated 
with investor response are: forecast horizon (REVP*FOR_HORIZON_D = 0.238, t-stat = 5.40), forecast 
                                                          
15
 Clement and Tse (2003) also find that investor response to forecast revisions increases with the forecast horizon 
although forecast horizon is negatively associated with forecast accuracy. They interpret these results as investors 
responding more strongly to timely forecasts made earlier in the year despite their relatively lower accuracy. The 
authors also find that investor response decreases with the number of days elapsed since the last forecast.   
16
 To interpret the economic significance of this effect, we consider a one standard deviation change in the 
association between SAR and REVP by estimating a simplified version of equation 1 (SARijt = α1 + β1 REVPijt + 
ε1
 
(untabulated) (Francis and Martin, 2010; Kravet, 2014). A one standard deviation decrease in β1 (0.07) is 
associated with a decrease in ROUND of −0.211 = (0.07/−0.331)*1. Compared to the standard deviation of 
ROUND (0.492 from Panel A, Table 2), this effect is economically significant.  
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frequency (REVP*N_FORECASTS_D=0.204, t-stat = 5.76), number of days elapsed since the last 
forecast (REVP*DAYS_ELAPSED_D = −0.167, t-stat = −4.08), and broker size 
(REVP*BROKER_SIZE_D = 0.066, t-stat = 2.31). The interactions between REVP and the remaining 
four analyst characteristics (prior accuracy, firm experience and number of firms and industries 
followed) are not significant at the 5% level. Based on these results we can reject H1, stated in the null. 
The findings from the multivariate analysis confirm the univariate evidence that when responding to 
analyst forecast revisions investors react less strongly to rounded than to non-rounded forecasts, 
consistent with investors using rounding as a proxy for less precise forecasts. One implication of our 
findings is that investors condition their responses on a subset of more readily observable forecast 
characteristics, consistent with Clement and Tse (2003) and Bonner et al. (2003) and with previous 
evidence on limited attention. 
 
3.3.2 Rounding repetition  
We next test how the market response to rounding in analyst forecasts varies with rounding 
repetition. Given that repetition increases the salience of a feature, this is a more powerful test of the 
salience effect. Table 5, Panel A presents univariate results on differences in cumulative size-adjusted 
returns between repeated rounding (REPEATED_ROUND = 1) and one-time rounding (ONE-
TIME_ROUND =1). In line with expectations, the returns to repeated rounding are significantly lower 
in absolute magnitude than the returns to one-time rounding for both good and bad news revisions. The 
three-day hedge returns (from going long on positive and short on negative revisions) are 2.4% (1.2% 
to REVP > 0 minus −1.2% to REVP < 0) to repeated rounding and 3.5% (1.5% to REVP > 0 minus 
−2.0% to REVP < 0) to one-time rounding. The difference between the hedge returns to repeated and 
one-time rounding is significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that investors treat rounded 
forecasts as even less precise when more than one of the simultaneously disclosed forecasts is rounded 
relative to when only the current forecast is rounded.  
We next estimate equation (1), distinguishing between repeated and one-time rounding. Panel 
B of Table 5 reports the regression results. The coefficients on the analyst characteristics (not tabulated 
for brevity) remain qualitatively similar to those in Table 4. The coefficient on REVP x 
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REPEATED_ROUND is negative and significant (coeff. = −0.378, t-stat = −11.35) and substantially 
higher in absolute magnitude than the coefficient on REVP x ONE-TIME_ROUND, which is not 
significant at the 5% level (coeff. = −0.102, t-stat = −1.79). The difference in the magnitude of the 
coefficients on repeated and one-time rounding is statistically significant ( 2χ =22.64, p-value = 
<0.001). Based on these results we can reject H2, stated in the null. The findings are consistent with our 
expectation, and the univariate evidence, that the repetition of rounding enhances its salience and 
increases investors’ perception of rounding as an indicator of less precise forecasts.  
 
3.3.3 Rounding and investor sophistication   
We next examine whether the response to rounding varies with levels of investor sophistication. 
Following prior literature, we use the extent of institutional ownership presence (e.g. Bonner et al., 
2003; Hilary and Hsu, 2013) and institutional turnover (Collins et al. 2003) as a proxy for investor 
sophistication. We first measure the percentage of institutional investor holdings (INST_HOLDING) in 
the firm, based on prior evidence that institutional investors are more sophisticated than retail investors 
and better able to process available information (Hand, 1990, Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). We 
distinguish between more and less sophisticated investors by separating the top (fourth) quartile of 
INST_HOLDING (HIGH_INST_HOLDING) from the first three quartiles (LOW_ INST_HOLDING) of 
our firm-analyst sample. The sample with available institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters 
consists of 183,369 observations over the 1984-2012 period. Average institutional ownership is 88% in 
the HIGH_INST_HOLDING sub-sample and 58% in the LOW_INST_HOLDING sub-sample.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results from the estimation of equation (1) for the 
LOW_INST_HOLDING and HIGH_INST_HOLDING sub-samples. The coefficient on REVP x 
ROUND is significantly negative in the LOW_INST_HOLDING sub-sample (coeff. = −0.283, t-stat = 
−7.07), but insignificant in the HIGH_INST_HOLDING sub-sample (coeff. = −1.140, t-stat = −1.33). 
To test whether the coefficient on REVP x ROUND differs statistically between groups, we pool the 
two sub-samples and introduce a three way interaction between an indicator variable for the 
LOW_INST_HOLDING sub-sample (LOW_OWN) and REVP x ROUND (untabulated). We also add an 
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interaction between LOW_OWN and REVP to control for differences in investor response to forecast 
revisions driven by the level of institutional holdings (Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2007) and an 
interaction between LOW_OWN and ROUND to account for correlation between rounding likelihood 
and lower institutional holdings (Dechow and You, 2012). The results from this specification yield an 
insignificant coefficient on REVP x ROUND (coeff. = −0.075, t-stat = −0.73) and a negative and 
significant coefficient on LOW_OWN x REVP x ROUND (coeff. = −0.240, t-stat = −2.19), indicating a 
significantly different market response to rounding in the LOW_INST_HOLDING and 
HIGH_INST_HOLDING sub-samples. As expected, this evidence suggests that the earlier results, 
consistent with investors using rounding as an indicator of less precise forecasts, are primarily attributed 
to less sophisticated investors.17 
Our second measure of investor sophistication is based on institutional investors’ trading 
activity rather than mere ownership, consistent with Collins et al. (2003). Since actively trading 
institutional investors are more attentive than retail investors to information in earnings-related signals 
(Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2011; Collins et al., 2003), the former are likely to attend less to the salience 
of forecast rounding when responding to analyst forecast revisions. We capture the trading activity of 
institutional investors directly through their portfolio turnover. We measure institutional investors 
turnover (INST_TURNOVER) based on the churn rates of the firm’s institutional holdings, i.e., the 
average frequency with which institutional investors rotate positions in their portfolios (similar to 
Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005). The calculation of investor turnover rates is a two-stage process. In 
the first stage we calculate a measure of portfolio turnover for each institutional investor in any given 
quarter (see Gaspar et al., 2005, p.143). In the second stage we calculate the investor turnover ratio at 
the firm level by calculating the weighted average of the total portfolio churn rates of firm’s institutional 
investors over the four quarters of each year. The sample with available institutional turnover data 
consists of 153,654 observations over the 1984-2012 period. We then distinguish between more and 
less sophisticated investors by separating the top (fourth) quartile of INST_TURNOVER in our firm-
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 Using the sample median of INST_HOLDING to distinguish between high and low investor sophistication, we 
find weaker evidence of differential investor response to rounding (and remaining analyst characteristics) across 
the two sub-samples. Therefore, the lack of investor response to rounding seems to pertain to the highest levels of 
investor sophistication, as captured by the top quartile of institutional ownership. 
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analyst sample (HIGH_INST_TURNOVER) from the first three quartiles (LOW_INST_TURNOVER). 
Average investor turnover is 0.372 in the HIGH_INST_TURNOVER sub-sample and 0.279 in the 
LOW_INST_ TURNOVER sub-sample. This means that the average firm’s institutional investors in the 
low- (high-) turnover group turn over 14% (19%) of their portfolio in a given quarter and 55% (76%) 
in a given year, implying an average holding horizon of 22 (16) months.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports results from the estimation of equation (1) for the 
LOW_INST_TURNOVER and HIGH_INST_TURNOVER sub-samples. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those in Panel A. The coefficient on REVP x ROUND is significantly negative in the 
LOW_INST_TURNOVER sub-sample (coeff. = −0.253, t-stat = −6.27), but insignificant in the 
HIGH_INST_TURNOVER sub-sample (coeff. = −0.048, t-stat = −0.38).18 The coefficients on the 
remaining analyst characteristics (included in the estimation but not tabulated) are similar to those in 
Panel B, with the exception of broker size, which is significant in explaining returns in the 
HIGH_INST_TURNOVER sub-sample but not in the HIGH_INST_HOLDING sub-sample.  
In Panel C we examine variation in investor response to rounding repetition. The coefficient on 
REVP x REPEATED_ROUND is negative and significant in the LOW_INST_HOLDING sub-sample 
(coeff. = −0.303, t-stat = −7.34) and the LOW_INST_TURNOVER sub-sample (coeff. = −0.282, t-stat = 
−6.61), but not significant at the 5% level in the HIGH_INST_HOLDING sub-sample (coeff. = −0.219, 
t-stat = −1.84), nor in the HIGH_INST_TURNOVER sub-sample (coeff. = −0.056, t-stat = −0.42). The 
coefficient on REVP x ONE-TIME_ROUND is negative and significant only in the 
LOW_INST_TURNOVER sub-sample (coeff. = −0.158, t-stat = −2.09). This provides some, albeit weak, 
evidence that the intensifying effect of rounding repetition on the perception of its salience is more 
pronounced among less sophisticated investors. 
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 To test whether the coefficient on REVP x ROUND differs statistically between groups, we pool the two sub-
samples and introduce a three way interaction between an indicator variable for the LOW_INST_TURNOVER sub-
sample (LOW_TURNOVER) and REVP x ROUND (untabulated). We also add an interaction between 
LOW_TURNOVER and REVP and an interaction between LOW_TURNOVER and ROUND. The results of this 
specification yield an insignificant coefficient on REVP x ROUND (coeff. = −0.029, t-stat = −0.23) and a negative 
and significant coefficient on LOW_TURNOVER x REVP x ROUND (coeff. = −0.247, t-stat = −1.90). These 
results are consistent with less frequently trading institutional investors using rounding as an indicator of less 
precise forecasts. 
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In summary, the results in Table 6 suggest that the market’s attention to rounding as a proxy 
for less precise forecasts pertains to the lower levels of investor sophistication, measured either through 
institutional shareholder ownership or trading activity. This enables us to reject H3, stated in the null. 
The use of repeated rounding as a stronger signal of forecast imprecision is also primarily attributed to 
investors with lower levels of investor sophistication, corroborating the earlier evidence. These results 
are consistent with previous evidence that less sophisticated investors are more susceptible to salience 
effects (Miao et al., 2013).  
 
3.3.4. Rounding and future returns  
So far we document a weaker market reaction to rounded compared to non-rounded forecasts, 
consistent with investors using rounding as a salient indicator of noisier earnings expectations. If 
investors’ use of rounding, and especially of repeated rounding, deters them from fully appraising all 
remaining informative cues, we expect a delayed market response to the information content of rounded 
forecasts following the revision announcement. Though the post-revision price drift to analyst forecast 
revisions is well-established empirically, relatively little is known about the extent to which it is affected 
by forecast-specific attributes (Gleason and Lee, 2003). Gleason and Lee (2003) find that post-revision 
announcement returns are associated with subtle aspects of the earnings revision signal (e.g. degree of 
forecast innovation). We examine whether rounding as a salient forecast-specific feature is also 
associated with stock returns following the revision announcement.  
Similar to Gleason and Lee (2003), we regress future size-adjusted returns over twelve months 
after the revision announcement, SARs [+2, +253], on a rounding indicator and the remaining factors 
expected to affect the delayed price response, i.e. revision quantity (price-scaled forecast revision), 
revision quality (forecast innovation), firm information environment (analyst coverage), and systematic 
risk factors (firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum). We choose this twelve-month-ahead 
window based on prior evidence of a post-revision drift up to a year after the revision announcement 
(Stickel, 1991; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Zhang, 2006, etc.), but repeat the analysis using the shorter 
period between the forecast revision date and the subsequent earnings announcement date.  The post-
revision drift documented in the prior literature takes the form of higher expected stock returns 
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following good news and lower expected stock returns following bad news. Accordingly, to capture the 
incremental effect of rounding on future returns, we create a categorical variable, ROUND_Signal that 
is equal to +1 for rounded forecasts with good news (ROUND = 1 and REVP>0), 0 for non-rounded 
forecasts, and −1 for rounded forecasts with bad news (ROUND = 1 and REVP<0). This variable 
construction implies a long position in firms with rounded good news revisions and a short position in 
firms with rounded bad news revisions. This approach is consistent with Gleason and Lee’s (2003) 
innovation signal variable construction and reflects our expectation of a delayed market response to the 
information content of rounded forecasts post-announcement.  Innovation_Signal controls for the effect 
of the level of forecast innovation on future returns. It takes the value of +1 (−1) for high innovation 
good (bad) news and 0 otherwise. Similar to Gleason and Lee (2003), we define forecast revisions as 
high innovation when the issued forecast is higher (lower) than both the analyst’s own prior forecast 
and the current consensus for good (bad) news. We control for the level of analyst coverage (Coverage) 
that a firm receives using an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms followed by more than the median 
number of analysts each year, and 0 otherwise. We measure the log of the firm’s market capitalization 
(Size) and the book-to-market ratio (B/M) at the end of the previous calendar year, and Momentum using 
the firm’s market adjusted returns over the twelve months prior to the revision announcement. 
Consistent with Hui and Yeung (2013), we limit the effect of outliers for these tests by trimming SARs 
[+2,+253], B/M, Size and Momentum at the top and bottom 1%.  
Table 7 reports the regression results. In the first column we regress future returns on revision 
quantity, revision quality, analyst coverage and risk controls. In this specification REVP is positively 
associated with future returns (coeff. = 0.362, t-stat = 2.91), consistent with prior evidence of a post-
revision announcement price drift. In line with Gleason and Lee (2003), the innovation signal is 
positively and significantly associated with future returns (coeff. =0.007, t-stat = 3.64). In the second 
column we add the rounding signal variable. The coefficient on ROUND_Signal is positive and 
marginally significant at the 10% level (coeff. 0.003, t-stat = 1.95) and that on Innovation_Signal 
remains positive and significant (0.006, t-stat = 2.98). This result suggests that rounding helps 
marginally explain cross-sectional variation in stock returns twelve months after the forecast revision. 
The relative size of the coefficients suggests that forecast innovation is superior in predicting twelve-
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month-ahead returns. A hedge strategy based on ROUND_Signal yields 0.6% abnormal returns over 
the next year compared to 1.2% based on Innovation_Signal, after controlling for the magnitude of 
revision, analyst coverage, firm size, book-to-market and momentum.19  In the next column we repeat 
the analysis using repeated rounding in place of rounding. The coefficient on 
REPEATED_ROUND_Signal is positive and significant (coeff. = 0.005, t-stat = 2.76), and of similar 
magnitude to that on Innovation_Signal (coeff. = 0.006, t-stat = 2.98).  This result suggests that repeated 
rounding and forecast innovation have similar ability to explain cross-sectional variations in the post-
revision price drift. The more pronounced contribution of REPEATED_ROUND_Signal to the post-
revision drift than ROUND_Signal is consistent with the previously documented significantly lower 
returns to repeated than to one-time rounding during revision announcements. To rule out a risk-based 
explanation for the explanatory power of the rounding signal in the post-revision price drift, we examine 
the three day size-adjusted returns, sorted on the preceding revision sign and rounding feature, around 
the subsequent earnings announcement date. If the drift is due to a delayed market response, rather than 
omitted risk variables, then abnormal returns should cluster around earnings announcements when 
information is released and the market is able to correct for the immediate under-reaction to the forecast 
revisions. The results show that the three-day hedge returns to positive versus negative forecast 
revisions for the entire sample, as well as for each rounding category (ROUND = 1 and ROUND = 0), 
are consistently positive. Consistent with Gleason and Lee (2003), we interpret this as correction of the 
market’s initial misperception about future earnings around the earnings release date. We document the 
highest hedge return to repeated rounding (0.344% compared to 0.309% for ROUND = 1 and 0.217% 
for ROUND = 0), consistent with the drift being highest for repeated rounding.     
Finally, we test a specification where we control for all remaining aspects of the forecast 
revision, i.e. analyst and forecast characteristics affecting the market response.  The results are 
qualitatively similar both for the rounding (column 4) and for the repeated rounding signal (column 5). 
Additionally, forecast horizon, prior forecast accuracy and firm experience are positively associated 
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 Since the estimated coefficients on the signals reflect the average abnormal return to a single position (either 
long or short), we obtain the average hedge return (i.e. the combination of a long and of a short position) by 
doubling the coefficient (as in Gleason and Lee, 2003). 
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with future returns (FOR_HORIZON_D coeff. = 0.006, t-stat = 1.99, LAG_ACCURACY_D coeff. = 
0.004, t-stat = 1.95, FIRM_EXP_D coeff. = 0.009, t-stat = 4.74,). These results suggest a delayed market 
response to less easily observable aspects of forecast revisions, such as the analyst’s prior forecast 
accuracy and firm-specific experience.  
Taken together the results in Table 7 provide evidence of a delayed market response to rounded 
forecasts. Rounding, especially when repeated across the forecasts of the analyst report, is associated 
with a delayed assimilation of information in analyst forecasts. While this evidence suggests that 
investors can enhance investment strategies (e.g. Stickel, 1991) by further conditioning the forecast 
revision on the rounding type, the hedge returns may be difficult to exploit after taking transaction costs 
into consideration.20 This is consistent with Mikhail et al., (2004) and Barber, Lehavy, NcNichols and 
Trueman, (2001) who also find that exploiting the slow market reaction to analyst forecast revisions is 
unprofitable because of transaction costs. Therefore, we treat the results in Table 7 as completion of the 
evidence of investor reaction to rounding on the revision announcement date, i.e. an immediate weaker 
reaction to the information in rounded forecasts is followed by a delayed market response post-
announcement.21 In addition, the evidence on investors’ delayed assimilation of information on analyst 
prior forecast accuracy and firm-specific experience further supports the idea of investors’ susceptibility 
to the salience of rounding and their relative detraction from less easily observable analyst 
characteristics. 
 
  
4. Additional analyses 
4.1 Firm-level determinants of the decision to round  
Herrmann and Thomas (2005) provide evidence that analysts who issue rounded forecasts share the 
characteristics of less informed analysts (i.e. they have lower prior accuracy, lower forecast frequency, 
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 For a detailed review of the related literature, see Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008a). 
21
 Mikhail et al., (2004) interpret similar evidence of incomplete market reaction, i.e. a strategy that generates 
excess returns but is insufficient to cover transaction costs, as consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) 
expanded view of market efficiency: in a competitive and rational economy, information gatherers must earn a 
return, in expectation, for their search and processing costs.  
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longer forecast horizon, and larger number of companies/industries followed). Dechow and You (2012) 
further show that the decision to round is a function of analysts’ cost-benefit analysis and is influenced 
by factors such as EPS magnitude, stock price volatility, trading volume, firm growth, size, and 
institutional ownership. To control for endogeneity in the rounding choice and mitigate concerns over 
omitted correlated variables, we run three tests (untabulated). First, we estimate equation (1) by adding 
firm-fixed effects. The coefficient on REVP*ROUND in this specification remains negative and 
significant. Second, we estimate equation (1) by adding firm characteristics associated with the 
likelihood of rounding and their interactions with REVP as explanatory variables. Consistent with 
Dechow and You (2012), we include the following firm characteristics: book-to-market ratio, B/M, the 
earnings-to-price ratio, EP, the net amount received from external financing activities, EXFIN, the 
number of business segments, N_SEGMENTS, the volatility of the firm’s returns, STDRET, and the 
firm’s trading volume, TVOL and interaction terms between these characteristics and REVP. 
REVP*ROUND also remains negative and significant in this specification. Third, we perform a 
propensity score matching analysis that minimizes selection bias related to firm characteristics 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In the first stage we estimate a logit model to obtain the probability of 
an analyst issuing a rounded forecast (ROUND=1). As discussed above, we include both analyst and 
firm characteristics in this model. Then we match each rounded forecast to a non-rounded forecast 
issued by an analyst with the closest propensity score for rounding. We replicate equation (1) for this 
matched score sample, setting ROUND equal to 1 for the treated (rounded forecasts), and 0 for the 
control observations (non-rounded forecasts). The estimated coefficient on REVP*ROUND remains 
qualitatively unchanged, indicating that investor reaction is weaker to rounded than to non-rounded 
forecasts. These results mitigate concerns that our earlier findings are affected by selection bias related 
to firm-specific characteristics. 
4.2 Investor reaction to rounding in the presence of a rounded consensus forecast 
A potential reason for repeated rounding, especially when the current and the previous forecasts 
are both rounded (in 59% of instances where the current forecast is rounded, the previous forecast is 
also rounded) is the presence of a rounded consensus forecast. When the consensus forecast is rounded 
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(in 52% of instances where the current forecast is rounded the consensus forecast is also rounded), 
analyst rounding may not be related to lower precision; it may simply reflect the market’s expectation 
of rounded EPS in the current period. To address this issue further we perform two tests (untabulated). 
First, we exclude rounded forecasts that are issued in the presence of a rounded consensus forecast. This 
also ensures exclusion of rounded forecasts that potentially capture herding behaviour towards a 
rounded consensus forecast. After excluding these forecasts, the coefficient on REVP x 
REPEATED_ROUND remains negative and significant. Second, we retain all observations and 
introduce an additional indicator of a rounded consensus forecast (ROUND_CONS). In this 
specification the coefficient on REVP x REPEATED_ROUND remains negative and significant. The 
coefficient on REVP x ROUND_CONS is also negative and significant. This result is consistent with 
investors treating rounded forecasts as less precise even when rounding simply reflects the expectation 
of rounded EPS.22   
  
4.3 If accuracy was all that matters 
If accuracy was all that matters, investor response to analyst forecast revisions would have been solely 
benchmarked against the ability of forecast characteristics to predict future forecast accuracy. As there 
could be factors other than forecast accuracy that are value relevant, we do not view forecast accuracy 
as the key benchmark in our main analysis.23 However, we perform additional analysis using forecast 
accuracy as a benchmark. Following Clement and Tse (2003), we regress forecast accuracy on all 
forecast characteristics, including rounding, and then compare the relative investor weights on rounding 
and the remaining analyst characteristics (Table 4) with the ability of rounding to predict accuracy. 
When we run the accuracy regression excluding rounding (results not tabulated), we find that all analyst 
characteristics except broker size are significant in explaining forecast accuracy whereas only a subset 
of them are significant in explaining returns. This finding suggests that investors condition their 
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 Consensus forecasts are sometimes disclosed in analyst reports. They are more often available on news agency 
sites like Bloomberg, Reuters and Factset. 
23
 For example, investors may respond more strongly to timely forecasts because acting sooner implies larger 
investing profits (Schipper, 1991), even though these early forecasts are generally less accurate than later 
forecasts.  
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responses only on a subset of the factors that predict forecast accuracy, consistent with Clement and 
Tse (2003) and Bonner et al. (2003) and the evidence on limited attention. When we include rounding 
in the accuracy regression, forecast horizon and forecast frequency are still the strongest predictors of 
accuracy, consistent with forecast horizon and forecast frequency having high weights in the returns 
regression (Table 4). Rounding, however, is among the least important factors in predicting forecast 
accuracy (along with the number of industries that the analyst follows) even though it has the highest 
coefficient in explaining the market response. So while investors’ weights on less salient forecast 
characteristics, such as forecast horizon and forecast frequency, are compatible with the high predictive 
ability of these characteristics for accuracy, investor response to rounding seems very strong relative to 
the limited incremental ability of rounding to predict accuracy. The inconsistency between investor 
weights and accuracy weights is even more pronounced when we perform the same analysis for repeated 
rounding. This result suggests that investors respond to rounding as an indicator of less precise forecasts 
despite its marginal negative association of rounding with accuracy.  
 
4.4 Robustness tests  
We conduct additional robustness tests on the ability of rounding to explain variations in 
investor response to analyst forecast revisions. First, when estimating the market reaction to rounded 
forecast revisions (equation 1), we redefine ROUND to include cases where both the current and the 
prior forecast used in the calculation of the revision are rounded whereas in the earlier tests we define 
ROUND on the basis of a rounded current forecast only. We find that the coefficient on REVP*ROUND 
where both the current and prior forecasts are rounded is negative and significant and larger in absolute 
terms than the coefficient on REVP*ROUND where only the current forecast is rounded. This implies 
that the market reaction is even weaker to rounded forecast revisions and reaffirms the effect of 
rounding repetition on investor response to analyst forecast revisions.  
Second, we include broker firm fixed effects in the regressions to control for the effect of broker 
firm affiliation on investor reaction to forecast revisions.  The main result is qualitatively unchanged 
with a negative and statistically significant coefficient on REVP*ROUND. The earlier evidence of 
investors’ use of rounding is robust to the inclusion of broker firm effects.   
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Third, we exclude negative forecasts to control for the possibility that the frequency of rounding 
differs systematically on either side of the zero threshold (Das and Zhang, 2003). The coefficient on 
REVP*ROUND is still qualitatively similar. Finally, we repeat the main analysis by excluding all 
overlapping forecast revisions (i.e. all forecasts issued in the same announcement window) to isolate 
the price reaction to non-confounded forecast revisions, consistent with Park and Stice (2000). In the 
restricted sample (222,448 observations) the coefficient on REVP*ROUND remains negative and 
significant, confirming the robustness of our key results to potentially confounding effects induced from 
the inclusion of overlapping forecasts.  
 
5. Discussion   
We examine investor response to forecast salience, as proxied by rounding. Our results show 
that investors respond to rounding in a way consistent with it being a proxy for less precise forecasts. 
Investors’ attention to the rounding feature in analyst forecasts manifests itself into a weaker reaction 
to rounded than to non-rounded forecasts. We find that investors’ reaction to rounding is even weaker 
in the presence of repeated rounding instances and mainly less sophisticated investors appear to use 
rounding as a signal of less precise forecasts. Finally, we document that rounding and, to a greater 
extent, repeated rounding in analyst forecasts help explain cross-sectional variation in post-revision 
announcement stock returns. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on 
limited attention in capital markets (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Huang et al., 
2013; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2013; Clement and Tse, 2003; Johnston, Leone, Ramnath and Yang, 2012; 
Palomino et al., 2009, etc.) by providing evidence on the variation in investors’ response to information 
salience. To the extent that our evidence is generalizable to other salient forecast features, the results 
suggest that investors pay attention to salient forecast features, even when these features have limited 
incremental information content. We also explore the role of repetition of salient features within the 
same report and provide new evidence that repetition intensifies investor attention to salience. We also 
shed new light on how investors’ reaction to salient forecast characteristics varies by investor type. 
Existing evidence suggests that disclosure of salient items reduces the information acquisition and 
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attention costs of less sophisticated investors. We show that in the context of salience associated with 
imprecision and enhanced by repetition, primarily less sophisticated investors appear to rely on salient 
features when appraising forecasts.  
Second, our study contributes to the literature on forecast rounding. Herrmann and Thomas 
(2005) examine whether capital market expectations are more closely aligned with consensus forecasts 
that include or exclude rounded forecasts. They show that returns first correlate more with earnings 
surprises based on expectations including rounded forecasts and then that prices move toward the more 
accurate forecasts of non-rounding analysts. Dechow and You (2012) further show that investors 
respond less to unexpected earnings (actual minus forecast earnings) when the forecast is rounded, 
consistent with a rounded forecast being a noisier proxy of the market’s expectation of earnings. Our 
contribution to these studies is threefold. First, we focus on investor reaction to forecast revisions as 
opposed to investor reaction to earnings announcements. Individual analyst forecast revisions play an 
important role in the dissemination of earnings-related information and are more frequent than earnings 
announcements. Examining investor response to rounding patterns of individual forecast revisions 
sheds light on the mechanisms by which individual analyst forecasts affect the market expectation of 
earnings. Second, unlike the two prior studies, we examine investor response to rounding in comparison 
to other forecast features that explain variation in price reactions to forecast revisions. This helps us 
assess the relative importance investors place on the rounding feature relative to other forecast 
attributes. Third, we condition investor reaction to rounding on rounding patterns (i.e. repetition within 
and across forecasting horizons) and investor type. This sheds light on the factors that explain cross-
sectional variation in investor response to rounding. 
Finally, our study adds to the literature on investor efficiency in processing analyst forecasts 
(Hui and Yeung, 2013; Zhang, 2006; Jiang, Lee and Zhang, 2005; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Elgers, Lo, 
and Pfeiffer 2001; Stickel, 1991, etc.). Gleason and Lee (2003) show that investors mainly appraise the 
most readily observable subset of informative analyst characteristics when responding to analyst 
forecast revisions, and as a result price adjustments occur subsequent to the forecast revision date. We 
contribute to this line of research by documenting that rounding helps explain cross-sectional variations 
in the post-revision price drift and its association with post-revision returns is comparable in magnitude 
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to that of other forecast characteristics examined by prior literature (e.g. innovation signal by Gleeson 
and Lee, 2003).  
In our analysis we assume that rounding is associated with measurement error. This is a 
common premise in the psychology, finance and statistics literatures that examine number rounding as 
a phenomenon. In addition, the accounting literature (e.g., Hermann and Thomas, 2005) and our study, 
provide evidence of a negative association between rounding and forecast accuracy. There could be an 
alternative explanation of rounding as well. It is possible that analysts round the revisions of their 
forecasts to make them more noticeable to investors. The Weber-Fechner law of ‘just noticeable 
differences’ suggests that, to be noticeable, the change in a stimulus has to be a constant ratio of the 
original stimulus. In the context of prices small absolute changes in price are likely to be more noticed 
by investors when applied to a low price than to a high price (Monroe, 1973). With regard to analyst 
forecasts, rounding may reflect analysts’ attempts to avoid the possibility that the revision goes 
unnoticed and to signal the direction of change in the forecast to investors. If this is true, rounding need 
not be associated with measurement error, but instead may represent an attempt to make a signal more 
noticeable; so that investors react more rather than less to information of rounded forecast revisions. 
This prediction, however, is not born out in our data. In additional analysis, we find that investor 
reaction to rounded forecasts revisions is weaker than non-rounded forecast revisions, affirming that 
investors view rounded forecast revisions as more imprecise.   
Our evidence suggests that both analysts and investors fail to understand the costs associated 
with rounded forecasts. For analysts, the simplicity of avoiding a rounded forecast by adding or 
subtracting an extra cent implies lack of effort and lack of incentives to be precise (e.g. low trading gain 
potential on the stock followed). This is consistent with Dechow and You  (2012)’s evidence that 
analysts issue rounded forecasts as a matter of cost-benefit considerations, i.e. when there are low 
economic incentives to be precise. It is also in line with the evidence provided by Johnston et al. (2012) 
that due to limited attention and inadequate incentives, analysts do not exert effort to adjust for the 14th 
week quarter in 53-week years which also has real consequences. Furthermore, analysts may be unlikely 
to add or subtract a cent to avoid rounded forecasts because doing so may adversely affect their forecast 
29 
 
consistency. Hilary and Hsu (2013) show that forecast consistency is much more important than 
accuracy for analysts’ career progression and reputation. Also, in the presence of multiple tasks, 
analysts may ignore rounding as a signal of lower quality since accuracy in analyst forecasts has a much 
smaller role in determining their compensation than other factors, such as increase in analyst visibility 
and customer rating, stock picking, and attracting investment banking business (Groysberg, Healy, and 
Maber, 2014; Emery and Li, 2009). 24 
From an investor perspective, attending more to salient and easy-to-process forecast features, 
such as rounding, implies less attention to informationally equivalent or more informative forecast 
characteristics (e.g. prior forecast accuracy and analyst firm-specific experience). While investors may 
lose money by ignoring all aspects of the economic environment, inattention to the whole set of 
available information may be economically justified because time and attention are costly (Hirshleifer 
and Teoh, 2003). Selective attention is further justified by the vast amount of available information, 
which increases information processing costs (Kahneman, 1973). Therefore, salience in earnings-
related signals may affect investors’ assimilation of information given the opportunity cost of time 
needed to process all informative cues.  
Our study unravels an important role for salient cognitive reference points in influencing 
investor perceptions, which may have important valuation consequences. Although the reported 
significant effects may appear statistically small, they still have important financial implications. An 
interesting avenue for further research would be to explore whether firms or analysts strategically use 
salient cognitive reference points (e.g. focal colours, vertical and horizontal lines) as a way of 
influencing investor perceptions. Our evidence also reveals an important role for the repetition of salient 
quantitative information in influencing investor judgements, which would be interesting to investigate 
further in the context of companies’ annual reports. Finally, there is evidence suggesting that analysts 
tend to neglect relevant financial statement information (e.g., Lys and Sohn, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; 
Elgers and Lo, 1994; Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997; Teoh and Wong, 2002). In this regard, it will be 
                                                          
24
 Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008b) also argue that systematic errors in analysts' earnings forecasts could be 
attributed to the inefficient processing of information, or could be due to analysts' incentives. Loffler (1998) 
concludes that analysts’ incentives should be considered in testing for the rationality of earnings forecasts.  
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interesting to examine analysts’ attention to salient earnings-related firm disclosures with varying 
information content.  
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  Appendix A: Definition of Variables  
Variable name   Variable definition 
ACCURACYijt Forecast accuracy measured as the difference between the maximum absolute 
forecast error for analysts that follow firm j in year t and the absolute forecast 
error of analyst i following firm j in year t, scaled by the range of absolute 
forecast errors for analysts that follow firm j in year t. The forecast error is the 
difference between firm j’s actual EPS and the last EPS forecast issued by 
analyst i for year t, scaled by price at the end of year t-1. 
BROKER_SIZEijt Analyst broker size measured as the difference between the number of analysts 
in the broker firm employing analyst i that follows firm j in year t and the 
minimum number of analysts per broker firm employing analysts that follow 
firm j in year t, scaled by the range of brokerage size for analysts that follow firm 
j in year t. 
B/Mjt The book-to-market ratio of firm j at the end of year t.  
_D Denotes that a variable is defined as an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the value 
of this variable is greater than the yearly median; 0 otherwise. 
DAYS_ELAPSEDijt  Days elapsed since the last forecast measured as the difference between the 
number of days from analyst i’s forecast of firm j’s earnings to the most recent 
forecast for firm j in year t and the minimum number of days between two 
adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings by any two analysts that follow firm j in 
year t, scaled by the range of the number of days between two adjacent forecasts 
of firm j’s earnings in year t. 
EPjt Earnings-to-price ratio, measured as the ratio of earnings per share for firm j in 
year t and firm j’s price at the end of year t.  
EXFINjt  Net amount of cash flow received from external (debt and equity) financing 
activities by firm j in year t divided by the market value of common equity of 
firm j at the end of year t. 
 
FIRM_EXPijt  Firm experience measured as the difference between the number of years of 
analyst i’s firm j-specific experience as of year t and the minimum number of 
years of firm j-specific experience for analysts that follow firm j in year t, scaled 
by the range of years of firm j-specific experience for analysts that firm j in year 
t. 
FOR_HORIZONijt The forecast horizon measured as the difference between the number of days 
from the forecast issuance date to firm earnings announcement date for analyst i 
following firm j in year t and the minimum number of days between forecast 
issuance and earnings announcement for analysts following firm j in year t, 
scaled by the range of forecast horizons for analysts following firm j in year t.  
Innovation_Signalijt Equals 1 when Innovation = 1 and REVP >0, −1 when Innovation = 1 and REVP 
<0 and 0 when Innovation = 0. Innovation = 1 when the issued forecast is higher 
(lower) than both the analyst’s own prior forecast and the current consensus for 
good (bad) news, 0 otherwise. 
INST_HOLDINGjt  The percentage of shares in firm j held by institutions in year t.  
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INST_TURNOVERjt The investor turnover for firm j that measures the investment horizon of the 
firm’s institutional shareholders over the four quarters in a year. We first 
calculate the weighted average of the total portfolio churn rates of the firm’s 
institutional investors over the four quarters in the year as in Gaspar et al. (2005). 
We obtain the churn rate for each institutional investor and each quarter as 
follows: 
& =
∑ | − *+*+ − ∆|∈.
∑ /0123024/01256302567∈.
 
where Pjt and Njit are the price and number of shares of firm j held by institutional 
investor i at the end of quarter t. The investor turnover for the firm is then   
89":!;<!:9"! = ∑ =(+?∈@ ∑ &,*B4+)?BD+ , where S is the set of 
shareholders in company k and wkit is the weight of investor i in the total 
percentage held by institutional investors at the end of quarter t. 
Momentumjt Market adjusted returns over the twelve months prior to the revision 
announcement date (measured as of day -2) 
N_FIRMSijt  The size of the analyst portfolio measured as the difference between the number 
of firms followed by analyst i that follows firm j in year t and the minimum 
number of companies followed by analysts that follow firm j in year t, scaled by 
the range of the number of companies followed by analysts that follow firm j in 
year t. 
N_FORECASTSijt  Forecast frequency measured as the difference between the number of forecasts 
issued by analyst i for firm j in year t and the minimum number of firm-j forecasts 
issued by analysts that follow firm j in year t, scaled by the range of firm-j 
forecasts issued by analysts that follow firm j in year t. 
N_INDijt The diversity of the analyst portfolio measured as the difference between the 
number of industries followed by analyst i that follows firm j in year t and the 
minimum number of industries followed by analysts that follow firm j in year t, 
scaled by the range of the number of industries followed by analysts that follow 
firm j in year t. 
 N_SEGMENTSjt  The log of 1 plus the number of business segments of firm j in year t.  
ONE-TIME_ROUNDijt  An indicator variable equal to 1 if only the current forecast in the analyst report 
is rounded, 0 otherwise. 
REPEATED_ROUNDijt 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 when an analyst report contains a rounded 
current forecast for firm j in time t (ROUND = 1) and a rounded previous forecast 
and/or rounded one-year-ahead forecast, 0 otherwise.   
REPEATED_ROUND_Signalijt 
 
Equals 1when REPEATED_ROUND = 1 and REVP >0, −1 when 
REPEATED_ROUND = 1 and REVP <0 and 0 when REPEATED_ROUND = 0. 
REVPijt Forecast revision defined as the difference between the current (latest before the 
earnings announcement) and previous forecast of analyst i for firm j in year t, 
scaled by price two days before the announcement of the forecast. 
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ROUNDijt An indicator variable equal to 1 if analyst i's forecast for firm j in year t ends in 
zero or five; 0 otherwise. 
ROUND_Signalijt Equals 1when ROUND = 1 and REVP >0, −1 when ROUND = 1 and REVP <0 
and 0 when ROUND = 0. 
SARs [−1,1]ijt The three trading day cumulative size-adjusted return surrounding analyst i’s 
earnings forecast revision for firm j in year t. The cumulation period starts in day 
−1 and ends in day +1, where day 0 is the forecast revision announcement date 
and days −1 and +1 are trading days. SARs are calculated as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold return of the firm and the buy-and-hold return of an 
equally-weighted portfolio of firms in the same NYSE decile.  
SARs [+2,253] The twelve months cumulative size-adjusted returns subsequent to the analyst 
i’s earnings forecast revision for firm j in year t. The cumulation period starts in 
day +2 and ends in day +253, where day 0 is the forecast revision announcement 
date and days +2 and +253 are trading days. SARs are calculated as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold return of the firm and the buy-and-hold return of an 
equally-weighted portfolio of firms in the same NYSE decile.  
SIZEjt The logarithm of firm j’s market capitalization at the end of year t. 
STDRETjt The standard deviation of firm j’s monthly returns over the twelve months 
preceding the end of year t. 
TVOLjt The trading volume of firm j’s stock over the twelve months preceding the end 
of year t. 
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Table 1  
 40 
 
Sample of analyst EPS forecasts and frequency of rounding 
This table presents the sample collection process and basic statistics on rounding in analyst forecasts and actual 
EPS. The sample consists of 268,970 analyst-firm-year observations for the period 1984-2012. ROUND is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 when analyst i’s forecast for firm j in year t is rounded (i.e. ends in zero or five) 
and 0 otherwise. REPEATED_ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 when an analyst report contains a 
rounded current forecast for firm j in time t (ROUND = 1) and a rounded previous forecast and/or rounded one-
year-ahead forecast, 0 otherwise.  ONE-TIME_ROUND is an indicator variable equal to one if only the current 
forecast in the analyst report is rounded, 0 otherwise. 
Panel A: Sample selection 1984 - 2012 
 Number of analyst 
forecasts 
Number of 
firm-years 
 
Number of firms 
Firm-year-analyst observations (based on last 
forecast per analyst and firm year) 
 
661,791 101,695 16,659 
At least one analyst issuing a rounded forecast 
and one analyst issuing a non-rounded forecast 
501,108 64,721 11,612 
 
Sample with available accounting data and 
three-day SARs around forecast revisions  
 
286,312 
 
51,056 
 
9,453 
    
Sample after standardization of analyst 
characteristics (deletion of single analyst 
observations per firm and year) and trimming of 
forecast revisions at top and bottom 1%  
 
268,970  
 
39,011 
  
7,311 
 
Panel B: Frequency of rounded forecasts  
  
Number of forecasts 
% 
 of total 
Total 268,970          100 
Rounded actual EPS   58,003  22 
Non-rounded actual EPS 210,967  78 
    
Non-rounded EPS forecasts 158,271  59 
Rounded EPS forecast (ROUND =1) 110,699  41 
REPEATED_ROUND =1 87,317  32 
ONE_TIME_ROUND=1 23,382  9 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics  
 
This table presents sample descriptive statistics. The sample consists of 268,970 analyst-firm-year observations for the period 1984-
2012.  
Panel A: This panel presents descriptive statistics of the main variables, calculated over the period 1984-2012. The definitions for the 
variables are provided in Appendix A.  
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th percentile 75th Percentile 
REVP −0.002 −0.001 0.072 −0.028 0.026  
ROUND 0.411 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000  
ACCURACY  0.633 0.778 0.375 0.333 0.979  
FOR_HORIZON  0.399 0.292 0.374 0.040 0.739  
BROKER_SIZE 0.446 0.379 0.364 0.096 0.791  
FIRM_EXP 0.367 0.214 0.397 0.000 0.750  
N_FORECASTS  0.430 0.400 0.362 0.000 0.714  
DAYS_ELAPSED  0.316 0.118 0.386 0.000 0.588  
N_FIRMS   0.391 0.316 0.364 0.000 0.667  
N_IND  0.338 0.200 0.373 0.000 0.600  
N     268,970       
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics (means) of variables by rounding type 
 ROUND = 1 ROUND = 0 Diff t-stat p-values  
REVP −0.004 −0.003 −0.001 −21.73 <0.001  
ACCURACY  0.615 0.646 −0.031 −20.87 <0.001  
FOR_HORIZON  0.433 0.375 0.059 40.21 <0.001  
BROKER_SIZE 0.447 0.444 0.003 2.34 0.019  
FIRM_EXP 0.378 0.358 0.020 12.53 <0.011  
N_FORECASTS  0.387 0.459 −0.072 −50.88 <0.001  
DAYS_ELAPSED  0.319 0.315 0.004 2.37 0.018  
N_FIRMS   0.386 0.394 −0.008 −5.32 <0.001  
N_IND  0.338 0.338 0.000 −0.25 0.801  
N  110,699 158,271     
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Panel C: This panel presents Pearson/Spearman correlation coefficients and p-values among the variables above/below the diagonal. The definitions for the variables 
are provided in Appendix A.  
 
 
SARs  REVP ACCURACY ROUND  
FOR_ 
HORIZON  
BROKER_ 
SIZE FIRM_EXP 
N_ 
FORCASTS  
DAYS_ 
ELAPSED 
N_ 
FIRMS N_IND 
SARs  1.000 0.138 −0.004 −0.001 −0.012 0.001 0.006 0.006 −0.006 0.000 −0.001 
p-value  <0.001 0.063 0.440 <0.001 0.609 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.823 0.507 
            
REVP 0.216 1.000 −0.017 −0.042 −0.020 0.008 0.011 0.047 −0.008 0.010 0.000 
p-value <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.815 
            
ACCURACY 0.000 −0.021 1.000 −0.040 −0.293 0.005 0.038 0.160 −0.021 0.026 0.000 
p-value 0.837 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 0.008 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.889 
            
ROUND  −0.004 −0.039 −0.028 1.000 0.077 0.005 0.024 −0.098 0.005 −0.010 0.000 
p-value 0.058 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 0.019 <0.001 <0.001 0.017 <0.001 0.801 
            
FOR_HORIZON −0.006 0.020 −0.235 0.080 1.000 0.003 −0.028 −0.384 −0.081 −0.059 −0.017 
p-value 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  0.124 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
            
BROKER_SIZE 0.001 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.005 1.000 0.014 0.054 0.044 0.064 −0.022 
p-value 0.605 <0.001 <0.001 0.994 0.017  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
            
FIRM_EXP 0.005 0.017 0.031 0.021 −0.018 0.020 1.000 0.019 −0.010 0.071 0.050 
p-value 0.008 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
            
N_FORECASTS  0.005 0.015 0.158 −0.101 −0.388 0.057 0.027 1.000 0.083 0.063 0.021 
p-value 0.011 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
            
DAYS_ELAPSED  −0.002 −0.025 0.002 0.020 −0.089 0.037 −0.013 0.070 1.000 0.018 0.021 
p-value 0.391 <0.001 0.438 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 
            
N_FIRMS  0.003 0.013 0.036 −0.008 −0.065 0.066 0.084 0.070 0.007 1.000 0.651 
p-value 0.118 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 
            
N_IND  0.001 −0.002 0.013 0.005 −0.027 −0.018 0.064 0.027 0.010 0.653 1.000 
p-value 0.735 0.336 <0.001 0.007 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
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Table 3  
Three-day mean cumulative size-adjusted returns around forecast revisions by revision sign and magnitude and 
rounding type 
This table presents 3-day (−1, 0, +1) mean cumulative size-adjusted returns (SARs) around forecast revisions 
(REVP). Day 0 is the day of the forecast revision and days –1 and +1 are trading days. SARs are calculated as 
the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the firm and the buy-and-hold return of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of firms in the same NYSE decile. REVP is defined as the difference between the current forecast (latest 
before the earnings announcement) and the previous forecast of analyst i for firm j in year t, scaled by price two 
days before the announcement of the forecast. Panel A presents SARs by REVP sign and REVP magnitude. Panel 
B presents SARs by REVP sign and REVP magnitude for rounded and non-rounded forecasts. ROUND is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 when analyst i’s forecast for firm j in year t is rounded (i.e. ends in zero or five) and 
0 otherwise. The sample consists of 268,970 analyst-firm-year observations for the period 1984-2012. */**/*** 
indicate significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels respectively (two-tailed t-test). 
Panel A: 3-day SARs by revision sign  
REVP sign REVP > 0  REVP < 0  Difference (REVP > 0 
– REVP < 0 ) 
SARs 0.014***  −0.016***  0.031*** 
N of obs. 123,337  142,864   
      
REVP magnitude Top 5% 50% - 95% 5% - 50% Bottom 5% Difference (Top % - 
Bottom 5%) 
SARs 0.023*** 0.012*** −0.015*** −0.028*** 0.053*** 
N of obs. 13,465 121,180 120,890 13,435  
 
Panel B: 3-day SARs by revision sign for rounded and non-rounded forecasts  
REVP sign REVP > 0  REVP < 0  Difference (REVP 
> 0 −REVP < 0 ) 
SARs| ROUND =0 0.016***  −0.018***  0.033*** 
N of obs. 75,264  81,581   
SARs| ROUND = 1 0.013***  −0.013***  0.026*** 
N of obs. 48,073  61,283   
Difference 
(SARs|ROUND = 1 – 
SARs|ROUND = 0) 
 
 
−0.003*** 
  
  
0.004*** 
  
      
REVP magnitude Top 5% 50% - 95% 5% - 50% Bottom 5% Difference (Top 
5% - Bottom 5%) 
SARs| ROUND = 0 0.027*** 0.013*** −0.017*** −0.032*** 0.059*** 
N of obs. 7,228 72,517 69,575 7,525  
      
SARs| ROUND = 1 0.018*** 0.010*** −0.013*** −0.022*** 0.041*** 
N of obs. 6,207 46,368 50,841 5,940  
      
Difference 
(SARs| ROUND = 1  – 
SARs|ROUND=0) 
 
 
−0.009*** 
 
 
−0.003*** 
 
 
  0.004*** 
  
 
 0.010*** 
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Table 4 
Market reaction to analyst rounding  
This table presents estimates from regressions of mean cumulative three-day size-adjusted returns (SARs) around 
forecast revisions on analyst forecast revisions (REVP) interacted with ROUND and other analyst characteristics. 
REVP is defined as the difference between the current forecast (latest before the earnings announcement) and the 
previous forecast of analyst i for firm j in year t, scaled by price two days before the announcement of the forecast. 
ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 when analyst i’s forecast for firm j in year t is rounded (i.e. ends in zero 
or five) and 0 otherwise. Appendix A defines the rest of the variables. The _D extension denotes the use of indicator 
variables, set equal to 1 if the underlying forecast or analyst characteristic is above the yearly median, 0 otherwise. 
The sample consists of 268,970 analyst-firm-year observations for the period 1984-2012. */**/*** indicate 
significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels respectively (two-tailed). t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm and revision announcement date to control for cross-sectional dependence and 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
                                                                                   SARs [−1,1]                          SARs [−1,1] 
 Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
(t-stat) 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
(t-stat) REVP  0.498*** 0.645*** 
  (9.10) (11.11) 
REVPEROUND − 
 −0.331*** 
   
 (−10.05) 
REVPEFOR_HORIZON_D  + 0.222*** 0.238*** 
  (5.02) (5.40) 
REVPELAG_ACCURACY_D  + 0.003 0.006 
  (0.10) (0.18) 
REVPEBROKER_SIZE_D + 0.066** 0.066** 
  (2.28) (2.31) 
REVPEFIRM_EXP_D + 0.050 0.060* 
 (1.52) (1.82) 
REVPEN_FORECASTS_D  + 0.224*** 0.204*** 
  (6.35) (5.76) 
REVPEDAYS_ELAPSED_D  − −0.165*** −0.167*** 
  (−4.00) (−4.08) 
REVPEN_FIRMS_D − −0.037 −0.036 
  (−0.88) (−0.85) 
REVPEN_IND_D  − 0.061 0.070 
  (1.38) (1.61) 
ROUND  
 −0.001*** 
  
 (−4.17) 
FOR_HORIZON_D   0.001 0.001 
  (1.06) (1.14) 
LAG_ACCURACY_D   
−0.000 −0.000 
  (−0.42) (−0.41) 
BROKER_SIZE_D  0.000 0.000 
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  (0.88) (0.89) 
FIRM_EXP_D  0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (2.80) (2.91) 
N_FORECASTS_D  0.001*** 0.001** 
  (2.72) (2.53) 
DAYS_ELAPSED_D  
−0.000 −0.000 
  (−0.59) (−0.58) 
N_FIRMS_D  
−0.000 −0.000 
  (−0.41) (−0.39) 
N_IND_D  0.001 0.001 
   (1.40) (1.43) 
Constant   0.003*** 0.004*** 
  (2.82) (3.21) 
Year dummies        YES                  YES 
    
Observations  268,970 268,970 
Adj. R2  0.0224 0.0235 
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Table 5 
The effect of rounding repetition 
Panel A of the table presents differences in cumulative three-day size-adjusted returns (SARs) around forecast 
revisions of repeated and one-time rounding analysts for the period 1984-2012. The differences in SARs are 
calculated separately for positive and negative forecast revisions. ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 when 
analyst i’s forecast for firm j in year t is rounded (i.e. ends in zero or five) and 0 otherwise. REPEATED_ROUND 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 when an analyst report contains a rounded current forecast for firm j in time t 
(ROUND = 1) and a rounded previous forecast and/or rounded one-year-ahead forecast, 0 otherwise. ONE-
TIME_ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 if only the current forecast in the analyst report is rounded, 0 
otherwise. Appendix A defines the rest of the variables. Panel B presents the results of multivariate analysis. In the 
interest of brevity, the panel reports the coefficients of the main variables of interest only. The sample consists of 
268,970 analyst-firm-year observations for the period 1984-2012. */**/*** indicate significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 
levels respectively (two-tailed). t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and 
revision announcement date to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated 
residuals. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis: 3-day size adjusted returns (SARs) by rounding type 
 REVP > 0  REVP < 0  Difference (REVP 
> 0 – REVP < 0 ) 
SARs|ONE-TIME_ROUND = 1 0.015***  −0.020***  0.035*** 
N of obs.      11,435  11,947   
      
SARs| REPEATED_ROUND =1 0.012***  −0.012***  0.024*** 
N of obs. 36,638  49,336   
      
Difference (REPEATED_ROUND =1 –        
ONE-TIME_ROUND = 1) 
−0.004***  0.008***  0.016*** 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis: 3-day size-adjusted returns (SARs)   
 
Variables  
SARs [−1,1]  
Coeff./(t-
  
 Coeff./(t-stat) 
(t-stat) 
  
REVP 0.640***   
 (11.53)   
REVPEREPEATED_ROUND −0.378***   
(−11.35)   
REVPEONE-TIME_ROUND 
  
−0.102*   
(−1.79)   
REVP E		ℎ!"!## YES   
Analyst characteristics  
Year dummies  
YES    
Year  dummies YES    
     
Observations 268,970   
Adj. R2 0.0230    
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Table 6 
Market reaction to analyst rounding conditional on the level of investor sophistication 
This table presents cumulative three-day size-adjusted returns (SARs) around forecast revisions for rounded and 
non-rounded forecasts conditional on measures of investor sophistication. INST_HOLDING is the percentage of 
institutional ownership. The HIGH_INST_HOLDING sub-sample includes observations in the top fourth quartile 
of INST_HOLDING and the LOW_INST_HOLDING sub-sample includes observations in the first three quartiles 
of INST_HOLDING. ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 when analyst i forecast for firm j in year t is 
rounded (i.e. ends in zero or five) and 0 otherwise.  INST_TURNOVER measures the average investment turnover 
of the firm’s institutional shareholders over the four quarters in the year. The HIGH_INST_TURNOVER sub-
sample includes observations in the top fourth quartile of INST_TURNOVER and the LOW_INST_TURNOVER 
sub-sample includes observations in the first three quartiles of INST_TURNOVER. REPEATED_ROUND is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 when an analyst report contains a rounded current forecast for firm j in time t (ROUND 
= 1) and a rounded previous forecast and/or rounded one-year-ahead forecast, 0 otherwise.  ONE-TIME_ROUND 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if only the current forecast in the analyst report is rounded, 0 otherwise. Appendix 
A provides a detailed definition of all the variables. The _D extension denotes the use of indicator variables, set 
equal to 1 if the underlying forecast or analyst characteristic is above the yearly median, 0 otherwise The sample 
with available institutional ownership (institutional investor turnover) data consists of 183,369 (153,654) analyst-
firm-year observations for the period 1984-2012. */**/*** indicate significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels respectively 
(two-tailed). t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and revision 
announcement date to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals.  
Panel A: Multivariate analysis: Investor reaction to forecast revisions across different levels of investor 
sophistication, measured by the percentage of institutional ownership.  
 Pred. 
Sign 
LOW_INST_HOLDING  
SARs [−1,1]   
Coeff./(t-stat) 
HIGH_INST_HOLDING  
SARs [−1,1] 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
 
 REVP  0.406*** 1.001***  
  (6.43) (4.54)  
REVPEROUND − −0.283*** −0.140  
  (−7.07) (−1.33)  
REVPEFOR_HORIZON_D   −0.082* −0.288**  
  (−1.86) (−2.08)  
REVPELAG_ACCURACY_D   0.189*** 0.161  
  (4.00) (0.94)  
REVPEBROKER_SIZE_D  0.041 −0.087  
  (1.17) (−0.74)  
REVPEFIRM_EXP_D  0.028 0.180  
  (0.90) (1.62)  
REVPEN_FORECASTS_D   0.165*** 0.113  
  (4.18) (0.98)  
REVP EDAYS_ELAPSED_D   0.069* 0.096  
  (1.91) (1.00)  
REVP EN_FIRMS_D  −0.014 −0.134  
  (−0.36) (−0.80)  
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REVP E N_IND_D   0.068 0.197  
  (1.64) (1.01)  
Analyst characteristics  YES             YES  
Year dummies   YES             YES  
Observations  137,534             45,835  
Adj. R2  0.0175             0.0326  
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis: Investor reaction to forecast revisions across different levels of investor 
sophistication, measured by the percentage of investment turnover. 
 Pred. 
Sign 
LOW_INST_TURNOVER 
SARs [−1,1] 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
HIGH_INST_TURNOVER 
SARs [−1,1] 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
 REVP  0.329*** 0.918*** 
 
  (4.40) (5.27) 
REVP EROUND − −0.253*** −0.048 
  (−6.27) (−0.38) 
REVP x Analyst characteristics          YES YES 
Analyst characteristics          YES YES 
Year dummies            YES YES 
Observations              115,254 38,400 
Adj. R2               0.0182 0.0321 
 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis: Investor reaction to forecast revisions across different levels of investor 
sophistication– the role of rounding repetition. 
 Pred. 
Sign 
LOW_INST_
HOLDING  
SARs [−1,1] 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
 
HIGH_INST_ 
HOLDING 
SARs [−1,1] 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
LOW_INST_ 
TURNOVER  
SARs [−1,1] 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
HIGH_INST_ 
TURNOVER 
SARs [−1,1] 
Coeff./(t-stat) 
   REVP  0.402*** 1.013*** 0.326*** 0.918*** 
  (6.38) (4.60) (4.36) (5.27) 
REVPE REPEATED_ROUND  −0.303*** −0.219* −0.282*** −0.056 
  (−7.34) (−1.84) (−6.61) (−0.42) 
REVPE ONE-TIME_ROUND  −0.158** 0.168 −0.065 −0.012 
  (−2.09) (1.13) (−0.77) (−0.06) 
REVP x Analyst characteristics  YES YES YES YES 
Analyst characteristics  YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies   YES YES YES YES 
Observations  137,534         45,835 115,254 38,400 
Adj. R2  0.0175 0.0329 0.0184 0.0321 
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Table 7  
Future returns and analyst rounding  
This table presents regressions of post-revision size-adjusted returns, SARs [+2,+253], on the forecast revision (REVP), signals 
related to the forecast quality, e.g. rounding, level of forecast innovation, analyst characteristics, and risk factors. ROUND_Signal
equals 1 when ROUND = 1 and REVP >0, −1 when ROUND = 1 and REVP <0 and 0 when ROUND = 0. ROUND is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 when analyst i’s forecast for firm j in year t is rounded (i.e. ends in zero or five), and 0 otherwise. 
REPEATED_ROUND_Signal equals 1 when REPEATED_ROUND = 1 and REVP >0, −1 when REPEATED_ROUND = 1 and 
REVP <0 and 0 when REPEATED_ROUND = 0. REPEATED_ROUND is an indicator variable equal to 1 when an analyst report 
contains a rounded current forecast for firm j in time t (ROUND = 1) and a rounded previous forecast and/or rounded one-year-
ahead forecast, 0 otherwise. Innovation_Signal equals +1 when Innovation = 1 and REVP >0, −1 when Innovation= 1 and REVP
<0 and 0 when Innovation= 0. Innovation= 1 when the issued forecast is higher (lower) than both the analyst’s own prior forecast 
and the current consensus for good (bad) news, 0 otherwise.  Appendix A defines the rest of the variables. The _D extension 
denotes the use of indicator variables, set equal to 1 if the underlying forecast or analyst characteristic is above the yearly median, 
0 otherwise SARs [+2,+253], BM, Size and Momentum and REVP are trimmed at the top and bottom 1%. The sample (after 
trimming) consists of 248,987 analyst-firm-year observations for the period 1984-2012. */**/*** indicate significance at 
0.1/0.05/0.01 levels respectively (two-tailed). t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and 
revision announcement date to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
 SARs[+2,+253] SARs[+2,+253] SARs[+2,+253] SARs[+2,+253] SARs[+2,+253] 
 Coeff./(t-stat) Coeff./(t-stat) Coeff./(t-stat) Coeff./(t-stat) Coeff./(t-stat) 
Constant −0.140*** −0.104*** −0.104*** −0.107*** −0.107*** 
 (−4.70) (-3.28) (-3.28) (-3.37) (-3.38) 
REVP 0.362*** 0.344*** 0.335*** 0.346*** 0.337*** 
 (2.91) (2.71) (2.65) (2.71) (2.65) 
ROUND_Signal   0.003*  0.003*  
  (1.95)  (1.92)  
REPEATED_ROUND_Signal   0.005***  0.005*** 
   (2.76)  (2.74) 
Innovation_Signal  0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (3.64) (2.98) (2.84) (2.91) (2.76) 
Coverage 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 
 (2.30) (2.26) (2.26) (2.21) (2.21) 
B/M 0.279*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 
 (4.69) (4.83) (4.83) (4.80) (4.79) 
Size 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (3.49) (3.54) (3.55) (3.36) (3.36) 
Momentum 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (2.90) (2.97) (2.95) (2.97) (2.96) 
FOR_HORIZON_D    0.006** 0.006** 
    (1.99) (1.99) 
LAG_ACCURACY_D    0.004* 0.004* 
    (1.95) (1.95) 
BROKER_SIZE_D    0.002 0.002 
    (1.10) (1.10) 
N_FORECASTS_D    0.002 0.002 
    (1.04) (1.04) 
FIRM_EXP_D    0.009*** 0.009*** 
    (4.74) (4.74) 
DAYS_ELAPSED_D    −0.007*** −0.007*** 
    (−3.35) (−3.35) 
N_FIRMS_D    0.003 0.003 
    (0.98) (0.97) 
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N_IND_D    −0.002 −0.002 
    (−0.55) (−0.54) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 248,987 248,987 248,987 248,987 248,987 
Adj. R2 0.0096 0.0098 0.0098 0.0101 0.0101 
 
 
 
 
